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Kohlberg’s Stages of Moral Development, Made Practical

Six stages of moral reasoning, how they are scored, and how to work with the reasons you give

What are Kohlberg’s stages of moral development?

Lawrence Kohlberg proposed six stages of moral reasoning, grouped into three levels: preconventional (judging by punishment and self-interest), conventional (judging by approval, group rules and social order), and postconventional (judging by universal ethical principles). Scoring analyzes the reasoning a person gives for a moral judgment, not only the answer. A 2010 review reports the sequence as confirmed in longitudinal studies (studies that follow the same people over time), while a 1985 review of 45 cross-cultural studies found striking support for several underlying assumptions and also caveats about how far the stages apply across cultures.

Lawrence Kohlberg’s theory of moral development holds that people do not just acquire a larger set of moral opinions over time. The way they reason about right and wrong changes in a sequence. Early reasoning is anchored in avoiding punishment and in self-interest. Later reasoning relies on group expectations, social order and law, and at the most developed end on principles of justice and universal ethical principles that can stand above existing rules. Kohlberg used moral dilemmas, including the Heinz dilemma: should Heinz steal a drug to save his dying wife? What mattered in his scoring was the reasoning behind the answer, not whether the answer was "right."

The stage descriptions on this page follow a 2010 review by Bataglia, Morais and Lepre that summarizes Kohlberg’s work, not Kohlberg’s own books. The practices below are ways to notice the reasons you give for a moral judgment, to hear other reasons, and to see whether your judgment reaches your action. None of them can tell you which stage you are at. Stage assignment in research depends on a structured interview scored against a manual, and a single reason never places anyone.

Práticas

Como estas práticas se conectam

Every practice on this page works on the same thing Kohlberg scored: the reasons behind a moral judgment, and whether those reasons come from punishment, approval, rules, or principles. Talking with people who reason differently and arguing their position well bring in reasons you did not generate; writing reasons out, naming the gut reaction first, and sorting reasons by kind make the structure of your own judgment visible; checking whether a conclusion becomes an action and testing a rule against its purpose test whether that structure holds when it costs something.

Does talking through a moral dilemma with other people actually change how someone reasons?

In a controlled school study, Blatt and Kohlberg (1975) gave one group of children twelve hours of discussion of moral problems, spread over twelve weeks, and that group tended to move toward higher levels of moral thinking compared with controls. The study was of children, and the abstract does not report group assignment or the size of the shift. The practice on this page applies the same idea to an adult conversation with someone who reasons from a different starting point, and it has not been tested in that form.

Why does Kohlberg look at the reasons behind a moral answer instead of the answer itself?

Because the same verdict can rest on different reasons. Bataglia, Morais and Lepre (2010) describe the Moral Judgment Interview as identifying the problem, the norm and the element a person uses in their answers, and the predominant stage is proposed by analyzing the answers to follow-up questions after each dilemma. The practice of writing out the reasons behind a verdict applies that same logic to your own decisions.

Why do I know what the right thing is and still not do it?

Moral reasoning and moral action are connected but not the same thing. Blasi (1980) reviews the conceptual and empirical issues about how moral reasoning relates to moral action, and describes two opposing views of that relation, one of which is essentially irrational and emphasizes need and action tendencies. On this page’s reading, a stated conclusion does not guarantee action. The practice of naming the specific action a conclusion requires, and checking whether it happened, makes the gap visible without claiming to close it.

Should I follow a rule, or should I ask whether it still serves what it was for?

Kohlberg’s highest stages describe reasoning from principles in which rules are accepted only when they are grounded in principles and general values, as Bataglia, Morais and Lepre (2010) summarize them. Asking what a rule protects separates following it for its purpose from following it only because it exists. This is the step the principle-test practice asks for, though Snarey (1985) reports caveats about the range and general applicability of the stages across cultures, so naming a principle is not proof that you are reasoning from one.

How do researchers measure which Kohlberg stage someone is at?

The main instrument described in the 2010 review is the Moral Judgment Interview, a semi-structured interview with moral dilemmas that is scored by analyzing the reasoning in the answers, and the review also describes the Defining Issues Test, which measures the proportion of postconventional responses. Rest, Narvaez, Thoma and Bebeau (1999) report a revised version, DIT2, that updates the dilemmas and changes the analysis method, with validity checks on age and education differences. A stage score from either instrument is a research estimate, not a label for a person, and no single reason or conversation can place someone.

Como escolher entre elas?

If you are in a disagreement where you cannot tell whose reasons are better, start with the practices about hearing and restating the other side, because you cannot judge reasons you have not understood. If you already have a judgment and want to see what is driving it, start with naming your first reaction and sorting the reasons by kind. If you already know what you think is right and the difficulty is acting on it, use the practice that turns the conclusion into one specific action with a date. If the situation pits a rule against someone’s welfare, test the rule against the principle it protects before you decide.

O que estas abordagens não resolvem

The sequence of Kohlberg’s stages was confirmed in longitudinal studies, as Bataglia, Morais and Lepre (2010) report from Colby and Kohlberg’s (1987) validity work, but the same review notes that Brazilian studies have not reported longitudinal evidence of their own. Snarey (1985) reviewed 45 cross-cultural studies and found striking support for several underlying assumptions, but also caveats about the range and general applicability of the stages, with bias toward complex urban and middle-class populations. Walker (1984) reviewed sex differences in moral reasoning and found only a few inconsistent differences in childhood and adolescence. Some studies show males higher in adulthood, but those differences are confounded with differences in education and occupation, and a meta-analysis found nonsignificant overall differences. Bataglia and colleagues report that critics including Gilligan argue the theory centers on a justice-based morality and undervalues affect and emotion. The dilemma-based evidence for change comes mostly from children in school studies. The link from moral reasoning to action is what Blasi (1980) reviews. None of the practices here has been tested as an intervention.

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Perguntas frequentes

What are Kohlberg’s stages of moral development?

Lawrence Kohlberg proposed six stages of moral reasoning, grouped into three levels: preconventional (judging by punishment and self-interest), conventional (judging by approval, group rules and social order), and postconventional (judging by universal ethical principles). Scoring analyzes the reasoning a person gives for a moral judgment, not only the answer. A 2010 review reports the sequence as confirmed in longitudinal studies (studies that follow the same people over time), while a 1985 review of 45 cross-cultural studies found striking support for several underlying assumptions and also caveats about how far the stages apply across cultures.

Como funciona «Talk through a moral dilemma with someone who reasons differently»?

Blatt and Kohlberg (1975) tested children in school, not adult conversations: one group was given twelve hours of discussion of moral problems other than the test dilemmas, spread over twelve weeks, and that group tended to move toward higher levels of moral thinking compared with controls. The abstract reports that outcome and gives no mechanism. This page’s hypothesis, not a finding from that study, is that a conversation with someone who reasons from a different place brings in the contrast between your reasons and theirs, which you have to hold in view at the same time, and so brings in considerations you would not generate alone.

Como funciona «Argue the other side in its own terms before you judge it»?

Walker (1980) tested Kohlberg’s proposition that cognitive and perspective-taking development are necessary but not sufficient for moral development. Children moved to stage 3 moral reasoning after a brief role-play in which they were exposed to it, but only the children who had reached the matching perspective-taking level advanced. Being able to take another person’s point of view is one condition, in Walker’s children, for advancing to stage 3 after exposure to it. This page’s reading, which the study does not test, is that the same point applies to seeing another person’s reasoning at all, which is why it starts with restating the other position.

Como funciona «Write the reasons behind a moral verdict, not just the verdict»?

Kohlberg’s measures do not score the verdict. Bataglia and colleagues describe the Moral Judgment Interview as a way to identify the problem, the norm and the element a person uses in their answers, and the predominant stage is proposed by analyzing the answers to follow-up questions after each dilemma. Writing the reasons out applies that logic to yourself and makes visible which norm is doing the work.

Como funciona «Name your gut reaction before you reach for reasons»?

Haidt (2001) argues that moral judgment is generally the result of quick, automatic evaluations, and that moral reasoning is usually a post hoc construction (a reason built after the judgment has been reached, to explain it, rather than the cause of it). If that account is right, the sense that something is wrong arrives before the reasons do, and the reasons are often built to support it. Naming the reaction first makes it visible, so that you can tell whether the later reasoning is testing the judgment or defending it.

Como funciona «Check whether your moral conclusion reaches your action»?

Blasi (1980) reviews the conceptual and empirical issues about how moral reasoning relates to moral action, and describes two opposing views of that relation, one of which is essentially irrational and emphasizes need and action tendencies. This page’s own reading, which the Blasi abstract does not state, is that Kohlberg’s stage scores measure reasoning, so a person can score high on what they judge right and still not act on it. Writing the next action down makes that gap visible.

Como funciona «Test a rule against the principle it is meant to serve»?

Bataglia and colleagues describe the postconventional stages as reasoning from principles: at stage 5, moral reasoning considers the social contract (the idea that rules rest on agreement among people for their mutual benefit) and individual rights, and at stage 6 it rests on universal ethical principles. In that account, rules are accepted only when they are grounded in principles and general values. Asking what a rule protects separates following it for its purpose from following it only because it exists, and that separation is what the postconventional description turns on.

Como funciona «Name which kind of reason is doing the work in your moral choice»?

Kohlberg’s early stages are defined by the kind of reason behind a judgment. Bataglia and colleagues summarize stage 1 as avoiding punishment, stage 2 as self-interest, stage 3 as meeting what others expect (the "good boy" orientation), and stage 4 as maintaining social order and authority. Naming which kind of reason is doing the work makes the motive visible, and a choice that rests mainly on approval or fear of consequences can be seen as different from one that rests on principle.

Does talking through a moral dilemma with other people actually change how someone reasons?

In a controlled school study, Blatt and Kohlberg (1975) gave one group of children twelve hours of discussion of moral problems, spread over twelve weeks, and that group tended to move toward higher levels of moral thinking compared with controls. The study was of children, and the abstract does not report group assignment or the size of the shift. The practice on this page applies the same idea to an adult conversation with someone who reasons from a different starting point, and it has not been tested in that form.

Why does Kohlberg look at the reasons behind a moral answer instead of the answer itself?

Because the same verdict can rest on different reasons. Bataglia, Morais and Lepre (2010) describe the Moral Judgment Interview as identifying the problem, the norm and the element a person uses in their answers, and the predominant stage is proposed by analyzing the answers to follow-up questions after each dilemma. The practice of writing out the reasons behind a verdict applies that same logic to your own decisions.

Why do I know what the right thing is and still not do it?

Moral reasoning and moral action are connected but not the same thing. Blasi (1980) reviews the conceptual and empirical issues about how moral reasoning relates to moral action, and describes two opposing views of that relation, one of which is essentially irrational and emphasizes need and action tendencies. On this page’s reading, a stated conclusion does not guarantee action. The practice of naming the specific action a conclusion requires, and checking whether it happened, makes the gap visible without claiming to close it.

Should I follow a rule, or should I ask whether it still serves what it was for?

Kohlberg’s highest stages describe reasoning from principles in which rules are accepted only when they are grounded in principles and general values, as Bataglia, Morais and Lepre (2010) summarize them. Asking what a rule protects separates following it for its purpose from following it only because it exists. This is the step the principle-test practice asks for, though Snarey (1985) reports caveats about the range and general applicability of the stages across cultures, so naming a principle is not proof that you are reasoning from one.

How do researchers measure which Kohlberg stage someone is at?

The main instrument described in the 2010 review is the Moral Judgment Interview, a semi-structured interview with moral dilemmas that is scored by analyzing the reasoning in the answers, and the review also describes the Defining Issues Test, which measures the proportion of postconventional responses. Rest, Narvaez, Thoma and Bebeau (1999) report a revised version, DIT2, that updates the dilemmas and changes the analysis method, with validity checks on age and education differences. A stage score from either instrument is a research estimate, not a label for a person, and no single reason or conversation can place someone.

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